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MORGAN v. ILLINOIS: THE RIGHT TO BALANCE
CAPITAL SENTENCING JURIES AS TO THEIR VIEWS
ON THE DEATH SENTENCE IS FINALLY GRANTED TO
DEFENDANTS
JOHN C. BELT*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1968, prosecuting attorneys could excuse jury members for
cause merely on the basis of the jurors' opposition to the death penalty.'
This loose standard for excusal allowed the State to select a jury in
which every member favored the death penalty. Attorneys practiced this
way for many decades 2 even though this left a significant portion of the
population ineligible to sit on capital juries.'
In 1968, the Supreme Court noted that the practice of excusing jury
members on the basis of the slightest opposition to the death penalty
"crossed the line of neutrality" and "produced a jury uncommonly willing
to condemn a man to die. ' 4 The Supreme Court set limitations upon
the State and its right to remove potential jurors. Since the Court's
decision in Witherspoon, States are limited to the removal of only those
veniremen whose views opposing capital punishment will prevent or substantially impair their ability to follow the law.'
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Morgan v. Illinois and held that
potential jurors whose views in favor of capital punishment were so
strong that they would automatically vote for the death penalty upon a
conviction of a capital crime could be challenged for cause. 6 The Court
of the
decided that both "life qualification" and "death qualification"
7
venire are necessary in order to make the jury impartial.
This article explores the history of "death qualification" and "life
qualification" of juries. It chronologically tracks the progression of the
law of jury impartiality in capital cases. The analysis focuses on the
United States Supreme Court case Morgan v. Illinois because it first
established the rule that a defendant has the right to "life qualify" the

* Member of Third Year Class, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.S. 1990, United States
Air Force Academy. The author wishes to thank Professor Victor Streib for his helpful comments
on earlier drafts.
1. Eric Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death Qualified Jurors, 62
TEx. L. REV. 977, 982 (1984).
2. See infra note 38.
3. See infra note 17.
4. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520-21 (1968).
5. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
6. Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2229 (1992).
7. Id.
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jury. Finally, the article introduces and examines a model statute. This
statute equitably balances the state's interest in eliminating anti-death
penalty jurors against the defendant's interest in eliminating jurors who
are predisposed in favor of the death penalty.
II.

THE HISTORY OF "DEATH QUALIFICATION" OF
POTENTIAL JURORS

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution gives a criminal
defendant the right to an impartial jury." In Duncan v. Louisiana the
Court invoked the Fourteenth Amendment and extended this right to
state criminal defendants. 9 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that
the Sixth Amendment also gives a defendant the right to a venire that
fairly represents a cross-section of the community and is not biased or
prejudiced against the defendant.' 0 The right to a representative venire
must be weighed against the State's right to exclude veniremen who
cannot carry out their duties to follow the law.
Prior to 1968, a venireman was inherently suspect any time he expressed
reservations about the death penalty." Most states authorized the exclusion
of a venireman for cause based on either a general objection to the
death penalty or an opposition to the death penalty.' 2 Members of the
legal community questioned this practice because it enabled prosecutors
to "stack the deck" against defendants by "hand-picking" jurors for
their willingness to execute the very defendant on trial. 3
A.

Witherspoon v. Illinois
It is widely recognized that a state has the right to inquire into a
prospective juror's attitude respecting the imposition of the death penalty. 4
The long-standing practice of removing all veniremen with general scruples,
however, changed in 1968. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,5 the United States
Supreme Court condemned the practice of removing veniremen with

8. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
9. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
10. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (exemption of all women because of preclusive
domestic responsibilities of some women insufficient justification for disproportionate exclusion of
jury); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (purpose of jury to guard against the exercise
of arbitrary power is not served if the jury pool is made up of only certain segments of the
populace); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six man jury provides fair possibility for obtaining
a representative cross-section of the community); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942)
(proper functioning of jury system requires the jury to be a body truly representative of the
community, and the selection of a special group of jurors simply because they would be more
competent is prohibited).
11. Schnapper, supra note 1, at 982.
12. Id. at 984-85.
13. Id. at 985.
14. See generally Joseph E. Edwards, Annotation, Comment Note-Beliefs Regarding Capital
Punishment as Disqualifying Juror in Capital Case-Post-Witherspoon Cases, 39 A.L.R.3D 550, 553
(1992).
15. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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reservations about the death penalty, remarking that the State of Illinois,
by removing veniremen for general objections to capital punishment, had
"crossed the line of neutrality" and "produced a jury uncommonly willing
to condemn a man to die.' ' 6 The Witherspoon Court held that a death
sentence cannot be upheld if the jury was chosen by excluding veniremen
for cause simply because they expressed general objections to the death7
penalty or had "conscientious or religious scruples" against the penalty.
The Court noted that one of the jury's most important functions is to
maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal
system. "I
William C. Witherspoon was brought to trial in 1960 in Illinois upon
a charge of murder. 9 A jury found him guilty and sentenced him to
death. 20 An Illinois statute provided that, in a trial for murder, a venireman
shall be excused for cause if he has "conscientious scruples" against the
death penalty, or "is opposed to the same." ' 2' At Witherspoon's trial,
the prosecution eliminated nearly half of the prospective jurors by chal-22
lenging any venireman who expressed qualms about capital punishment.

16. Id. at 520-21.
17. Id. at 523. While this was the limited holding of the case, the language set forth in footnotes
9 and 21 has since been adopted as the explicit standard for the exclusion of prospective jurors.
See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 455 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he label
'dictum' does not begin to convey the status that the restrictions embodied in footnote 21 have
achieved in this Court and state and federal courts over the last decade and a half."); Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 265 (1970); Boulden v. Holman, 394
U.S. 478, 482 (1969); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1980); Hackathorm v. Decker,
438 F.2d 1363, 1366 (5th Cir. 1971); People v. Washington, 458 P.2d 479, 496-97 (Cal. 1969).
The Court in Witherspoon stated that in a nation where less than half of the people believe in
the death penalty, a jury composed only of such people cannot speak for the community. 391 U.S.
at 519-20. The Court further cited to a 1966 study in which 42% of the American public favored
capital punishment for convicted murderers, 47% opposed capital punishment for convicted murderers,
and 11% were undecided. Id. at 520 n.16.
18. 391 U.S. at 519 n.15. The Court stated that without this link, the determination of punishment
would hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
19. 391 U.S. at 512. Witherspoon had been struggling with a woman when a police car stopped
at a nearby traffic light. The woman was able to free herself from Witherspoon's grasp and ran
and told the policemen in the car that Witherspoon was carrying a gun. Witherspoon ran away,
and the policemen ran after him. When one of the policemen began to search a trailer in which
Witherspoon was hiding, Witherspoon shot and killed him in order to escape arrest. The policeman
identified Witherspoon in the hospital before dying. Id. at 533 (Black, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 512.
21. Id. Furthermore, in Illinois, the jury is given broad discretion to decide whether or not
death is "the proper penalty" in a given case. Id. at 519; see also id. at 521 n.20 ("[Tihe State
of Illinois empowered the jury . . . to answer 'yes' or 'no' to the question whether this.defendant
was fit to live.").
Decisions since Witherspoon v. Illinois have held that a State may not leave the decision of
whether to impose capital punishment upon a particular defendant solely to the discretion of the
jury. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. 391 U.S. at 513. Forty-seven veniremen were successfully challenged for cause based on their
attitudes towards the death penalty. Only 5 of the 47 explicitly stated that under no circumstance
would they vote to impose the death penalty. Six stated that they did not "believe in the death
penalty" and were excused without any attempt to determine if they could nonetheless vote for
capital punishment. Thirty-nine jurors indicated that they had "conscientious or religious scruples
against the infliction of the death penalty" and no effort was made to ascertain if these scruples
would compel them to vote against capital punishment. Id. at 514-15.
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Witherspoon established the rule that a prospective juror who expresses
scruples against the death penalty may not be challenged for cause unless

his beliefs are such as to (i) bias his determination of the primary issue
of guilt or innocence, or (ii) prevent him from considering the death
penalty as a possible punishment upon a finding of guilt. 23 The Court

stated that sometimes a venireman's scruples against capital punishment
are expressed as reservations against finding a man guilty when the
punishment might be death. 24 In such cases, the State will be allowed

to successfully challenge the venireman for cause in order to avoid his
bias.
If the venireman's views on capital punishment will not bias his determination of a defendant's guilt, then in order to excuse him, his views
must be such that he is "irrevocably committed" to vote against the
death penalty. 25 Furthermore, his views must prevent him from carrying

out his responsibilities as a juror. 26 In other words, even though a juror
is "irrevocably committed" to his belief that capital punishment should
never be inflicted, he may nonetheless be able to subordinate his personal
views to his duty to abide by his oath as a juror. 27 If the juror convinces
the court that he is able to do this, then constitutionally, he cannot be
excused from the jury.
A court may not exclude a venireman who merely expresses that he
would not vote for the death penalty under certain circumstances. 21 In
other words, a state may exclude only veniremen who would vote against
capital punishment without regard to the evidence at trial. 29 A venireman
can only be excused for cause if he expresses that he is irrevocably
committed to vote against the death penalty in all cases.
Witherspoon condemned the assumption that a scrupled juror will
automatically and exclusively follow his conscience and ignore his legal

duties. 30 After Witherspoon, courts are required to inquire whether a

23. Id. at 522-23 n.21.
24. Id. at 513 n.5.
25. Id. at 522 n.21 ("The most that can be demanded of a venireman in this regard is that
... he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of
death.").
26. Id. at 514-15 n.7 ("It is entirely possible, of course, that even a juror who believes that
capital punishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition could
nonetheless subordinate his personal views to what he perceived to be his duty to abide by his oath
as a juror and obey the law of the State.").
27. Id. at 514 n.7; see also id. at 519 ("A man who opposes the death penalty, no less than
one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted him by the State and can thus
obey the oath he takes as a juror."); Bouldon v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1969) ("[lI]t is
entirely possible that a person who has a 'fixed opinion against' or who does not 'believe in' capital
punishment might nevertheless be perfectly able as a juror to abide by existing law-to follow
conscientiously the instructions of a trial judge and to consider fairly the imposition of the death
sentence in a particular case.").
28. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21 ("Just as veniremen cannot be excluded for cause on the ground that
they hold such views, so too they cannot be excluded for cause simply because they indicate that
there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital punishment.").
29. Id.
30. Id. at 515-16 n.9 ("[lI]t cannot be assumed that a juror who describes himself as having
'conscientious or religious scruples' against the infliction of the death penalty or against its infliction
'in a proper case' . . . thereby affirms that he could never vote in favor of it or that he would
not consider doing so in the case before him.").
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scrupled venireman will be able to uphold the law. The refusal to indulge
in assumptions about the actual views of veniremen toward the death
penalty was central to the Witherspoon decision. 3
Even though the majority of the Court refused to speculate about the
actual views of veniremen, this refusal was not unanimous. Justice Black,
joined by Justices Harlan and White, wrote in his dissent that the
majority's distinction between scruples against the death penalty and a
refusal to vote for it was just "semantic camouflage. 3 2 Justice Black
stated that an individual who has "conscientious or religious scruples"
against capital punishment will seldom, if ever, vote to impose the death
penalty.33 The dissent stated that the majority decision was simply a
attempt by the Court to hold capital punishment unconstitudisguised
4

tional .

Justice Black also raised an important issue that was not addressed
by the majority. He defended the State's and the people's right to an
impartial jury.35 Justice Black cited an earlier case where the Supreme
Court stated that the requirement of an impartial jury requires freedom
from bias against the prosecution as well as the State.3 6 Justice Black
explained that a person who has conscientious scruples against a critical
issue of the trial cannot stand "indifferent between the government and
the accused" and try the case according to the particular law and evidence.3 7
Justice Black's views regarding impartial jurors are not unfamiliar to
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Logan v. United States,38 the Supreme
Court held, over a century ago, that veniremen sitting in a capital case
who expressed "conscientious scruples in regard to the infliction of the
death penalty for [a] crime" were rightly challenged for cause.3 9 While
removing scrupled veniremen had been the practice of the courts for
many years, the majority of the Witherspoon Court condemned this
practice. 40
It is interesting to note that Justice Douglas' opinion in Witherspoon,
classified as neither a dissent nor a concurrence, revealed a logical error
in the majority's opinion. The majority's decision to include scrupled
veniremen was based on the idea that the jury would be made more
representative of society as a whole. 4 ' The problem with this theory,

31. Schnapper, supra note 1, at 993.
32. 391 U.S. at 536 (Black, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 535-36 (Black, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 532 (Black, J.,dissenting).
35. Id. at 535 (Black, J.,dissenting).
36. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
37. 391 U.S. at 536 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. 144 U.S. 263 (1892) ("A juror who has conscientious scruples on any subject, which prevent
him from standing indifferent between the government and the accused, and from trying the case
according to the law and the evidence, is not an impartial juror.").
39. Id.at 298.
40. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519.
41. Id. at 519 ("[l]n a nation [in which] less than half of whose people believe in the death
penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.").
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however, is that "[t]he idea that a jury should be 'impartially drawn
from a cross-section of the community' certainly should not mean a
selection of only those with a predisposition to impose the severest sentence
or with a predisposition to impose the least one that is possible." ' 42 Justice
Douglas felt that if the majority wanted to allow scrupled jurors on the
jury to make it impartial, it should have made the jury completely
impartial by allowing those jurors irrevocably committed to vote against
43
the death penalty.
Witherspoon not only requires that a venireman be unwilling to impose
a sentence of death, but also that the evidence be "unmistakably clear"
that constitutional standards have been met.44 The Supreme Court expressly made the point that a court cannot simply assume that a juror
will not impose capital punishment.4 1 It is this requirement of "unmistakable clarity" that is the "linchpin" of the holding in Witherspoon v.
6 "Unmistakable
Illinois.4
clarity" assures that challenges to scrupled veniremen are based on what the veniremen actually say, not on what a
judge infers that the veniremen feel on the issue of capital punishment.47
There are three important ideas which the practicing attorney should
take from Witherspoon. First, a venireman's beliefs do not disqualify
her from a jury. Instead, it is the venireman's inability to be impartial
that will cause her to be removed from a jury. 48 The decision to exclude
a venireman is based on the venireman's statement about how she will
actually vote and not on testimony regarding her beliefs or ideologies. 49
Second, the improper removal of a scrupled venireman does not affect
the guilt phase of a trial. Noting that scrupled veniremen were left on
the jury, the Court in Witherspoon refused to overturn the finding of
guilt.50 The Court stated that the petitioner's evidence was "too tentative
and fragmentary" to establish that jurors not opposed to the death
penalty are more likely to return a guilty verdict. 5 The Court was not

42. Id. at 524-25 (opinion of Douglas, J.). Justice Douglas cited Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940) ("It is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public
justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community.").
43. 391 U.S. at 528 (opinion of Douglas, J.).
44. Id. at 522 n.21.
45. Id. at 515 n.9.
46. See Schnapper, supra note 1, at 990.
47. Id.
48. See Edwards, supra note 14, at 554.
49. 391 U.S. at 522 n.21; id. at 515 n.9 ("Unless a venireman states unambiguously that he
would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment no matter what the trial
might reveal, it simply cannot be assumed that that is his position.").
50. Id. at 517-18.
51. Id. at 517. Witherspoon cited two different surveys in his brief in support of his assertion
that removing scrupled jurors increased the likelihood of conviction. One study found that "a jury
consisting only of jurors who have no scruples against the death penalty is likely to be more
prosecution prone than a jury in which objectors to the death penalty sit" and that "the defendant's
chances of acquittal are somewhat reduced if the objectors are excluded from the jury." 391 U.S.
at 517 n.10.
Since Witherspoon, numerous studies have all but confirmed that "death qualified" juries are
conviction-prone. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 460 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
David G. Sequin & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Effects on "Death Qualification" on Juror and Jury
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52
ready to announce a per se constitutional rule, but it also did not
preclude a defendant from showing that she was3 prejudiced by a particular
jury which failed to include scrupled jurors.
The final, and perhaps most important, teaching of Witherspoon is
that the Court did not grant a right to defendants; rather, it placed a
limitation upon the State. In other words, Witherspoon did not create
4
a ground for challenging a prospective juror. Instead, the Court placed
a limitation on the State's power to exclude veniremen; attorneys could
no longer exclude veniremen on "any broader basis" than their inability
to follow the law."

The Changed Role of Capital Juries
The Supreme Court completely changed the role of56 capital sentencing
juries in 1972 when it decided Furman v. Georgia. In Furman, the
Court held that death sentences imposed under statutes which leave juries
with the "untrammeled discretion" to impose or withhold the death
57
penalty violate the Eighth Amendment. After Furman, juries could no
longer be vested with unlimited discretion to determine whether a8 defendant should be given the death penalty or life imprisonment. In
Gregg v. Georgia, the Court expanded on Furman and held that the
death penalty could not be imposed under sentencing procedures which
create a risk that the sentence will be imposed in an "arbitrary or
capricious manner." 5 9
B.

C. Adams v. Texas
The opinion in Gregg v. Georgia left open the question of whom a
state may exclude from a jury in a case where the jury did not have
unbridled discretion. In Adams v. Texas, the Court faced the issue of
Decisionmaking: An Analysis from Three Perspectives, 8 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 49 (1984); Robert
Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury
Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984); Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson, & Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Juror's Predisposition to Convict and on the
Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HuM. BEItAV. 53 (1984); William C. Thompson, Claudia L.
Cowan, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, & Joan C. Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction
Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 95 (1984)).
52. 391 U.S. at 518.
53. Id. at 520 n.18 ("[A] defendant convicted by such a jury in some future case might still
attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt.").
54. Id.at 522 n.21.
55. Id. It should also be pointed out that the State gave the jury complete discretion during
trial to choose capital punishment or life imprisonment. This was an important consideration in
the Court's decision to prohibit the State from excluding veniremen for merely having general
scruples about the death penalty. The Court stated, "a juror's general views about capital punishment
play an inevitable role in any such decision [as to whether the death penalty is the proper penalty
in a given case]." Id. at 519. "[ln Illinois, as in other States, the jury is given broad discretion
to decide whether or not death is 'the proper penalty' in a given case." Id. at 519.
56. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
57. Id.
58. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 422 (1985).
59. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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whether Texas had contravened the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
when it excluded members of the venire because they were unable to
take the oath that the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment
would not affect their deliberations on any issue of fact.60 The Court
held that these exclusions were inconsistent with Witherspoon.61
Trials for capital offenses in Texas are conducted in a bifurcated
system. 62 During the first phase of the system, the jury considers the
question of guilt. In the second phase, the jury considers sentencing. At
sentencing, the Texas statute requires the jury to answer three questions
which are based on evidence adduced at either the first or second phase
of the trial. 61 If the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer
to every one of the three questions is "yes," the court is required to
impose a sentence of death."
The petitioner in Adams v. Texas was charged with the murder of a
police officer, a capital offense. 65 During voir dire examination of the
prospective jurors, the prosecutor questioned whether the jurors' attitudes
about the death penalty permitted them to swear under oath that they
would not allow the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment
affect their views on any issue of fact." As a result of the voir dire
examination, the trial judge excused all the veniremen who could not
take such an oath. 67 Ultimately, the jury answered the statutory questions
affirmatively after convicting the petitioner of the charged offense. 6 The
trial judge, as required by statute, sentenced the petitioner to death. 69
In its holding, the Adams Court confirmed the general proposition
that a venireman may not be excluded unless his views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." ' 70
The Court also stated that it had "little difficulty in concluding that

60. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
61. Id. There was, however, one dissenter, Justice Rehnquist, who felt that Witherspoon did
not cast any doubt upon the constitutionality of the oath required by the Texas statute. He explained
that the Supreme Court decisions of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), all left little doubt that a State may not leave
the
decision whether to impose the death penalty to the "untrammeled discretion of a jury." 448 U.S.
at 53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. 448 U.S. at 40.
63. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West 1979). The jury is required to answer the
following three questions: (i) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the
deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised
by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable
in
response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. Id.
64. Id. § 37.071(b).
65. 448 U.S. at 41.
66. Id. at 42.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 45.

Winter 19941

DEATH PENALTY JURIES

[the Witherspoon] rule applies to the bifurcated procedure."'" The Texas
statute that sets forth the oath "focuses the inquiry directly on the
and hence clearly falls
prospective juror's beliefs about the death penalty,
' 72 Additionally, the Court
doctrine."
within the scope of the Witherspoon
held that the State may exclude veniremen whose views make them unable
to exclude
to follow the law, but the State cannot broaden the statute
7"
penalty.
death
the
of
opinions
their
on
veniremen based
D. Wainwright v. Witt
In 1985, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Wainwright
v. Witt in order to clear up "general confusion" surrounding the ap74
plication of the Witherspoon standard. The Court held that Witherspoon's requirement that veniremen show with "unmistakable clarity"
that they would automatically vote against the death penalty is no longer
an appropriate test. 75 The Court found instead that the test set forth in
Adams-a venireman's views about the death penalty may not be the
basis for a challenge for cause unless those views would "prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instructions and his oath' "76-provided a better standard for
exclusion of a venireman who may have strong views on capital punishment .77
Johnny Paul Witt was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced
to death. 78 Witt was tried by a jury and the trial judge 79followed the
recommendation of the jury and sentenced Witt to death. On appeal,
Witt claimed that several prospective jurors had been improperly excluded
v. Illinois.80
for cause under the standards found in Witherspoon
The Witt Court set forth three reasons why it preferred the Adams
standard over Witherspoon. First, the Court noted that the decisions in
Furman v. Georgia and Gregg v. Georgia significantly changed the 8duties
of present-day capital sentencing juries by limiting juror discretion. ' The
Court observed that under the unlimited juror discretion standard of
Witherspoon, the only way a juror failed to uphold her duty as a juror

71. Id.
72. Id. at 48.
73. Id. at 48-49.
74. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1985).
75. Id. at 424.
76. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
77. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424.
78. Id. at 414. The murder was committed while Witt and a friend were bow-and-arrow hunting.
The evidence showed that the two had spoken together on other occasions about stalking and killing
a human being. On the day of the murder, Witt and his accomplice were hunting in a wooded
area near a trail often used by children. When the victim, an eleven-year-old boy, rode by on his
bicycle, the accomplice hit the boy on the head with a drill bit. Witt and his friend then gagged
and stunned the victim, placed him in the trunk of Witt's car, and drove to a deserted grove.
Upon opening the trunk, the conspirators discovered that the boy had suffocated. The two committed
various sexual and violent acts on the body and then dug a grave and buried it. Id.
79. Id. at 415.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 422.
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was by refusing to consider the penalty of death. 82 Furman and Gregg
had modified Witherspoon to enable the State to also challenge veniremen
for refusal to answer truthfully the questions of the trial judge.83 The
Court refused to attribute a broader meaning to Witherspoon: "To hold
that Witherspoon requires anything more would be to hold, in the name
of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, that a State must
allow a venireman to sit despite the fact that he will be unable to view
the case impartially.' "
The Court's second reason for preferring the Adams standard was that
the Witherspoon criteria for juror exclusion was dicta.8 5 Despite the fact
that much subsequent case law has followed the Witherspoon standards,
the Witt Court felt that the language for juror exclusion, as dicta,8 6 was
"not controlling." 8 7
Third, the Court reasoned that "the Adams standard was proper because
it is in accord with the traditional reasons for excluding jurors and with
the circumstances under which such determinations are made." 8 8 The
Court did not find it necessary to distinguish between capital sentencing
juries and ordinary juries because the Witherspoon standard is "not
grounded in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, but in the Sixth Amendment. ' 89
In spite of the Court's justification of its preference for the Adams
test, its reasoning is perhaps illogical. For example, Witt was the first
case to treat Adams as creating a new standard. 90 In fact, most courts
that have followed Adams interpreted the "substantial impairment" language to be a clear endorsement of the Witherspoon standard, and the
courts continued to apply the Witherspoon language. 9' The Court did
not claim to fashion a new test at any point in the Adams opinion.92
Instead, Adams merely applied the doctrine of Witherspoon to the Texas
bifurcated procedure, 93 and Adams even cited Witherspoon's footnote
twenty-one with approval. 94
82. Id. Under the sentencing scheme in Witherspoon, nothing more was required of a
juror
other than to be able to "follow the law and abide by his oath" in choosing the "proper"
sentence.
Id. at 421.
83. Id. at 422.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See supra note 17.
87. Witt, 469 U.S. at 422.
88. Id. at 423.
89. Id.
90. Valerie T. Rosenson, Note, Wainwright v. Witt: The Court Casts a False Light Backward,
66 B.U. L. Rv.311, 325 (1986).
91. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467
U.S.
1230 (1984), vacated, 469 U.S. 1202 (1985); Davis v. Zant, 721 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1983);
O'Bryan
v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1982); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1980);
State v.
Mercer, 618 S.W.2d I (Mo. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981).
92. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
93. Id. at 47.
94. Id. at 44. Footnote 21 pointed out that the decision did not create a new ground
for
defendants to challenge jurors. Rather, it limited the State's ability to challenge jurors. Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
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Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Witt, pointed out many flaws in the
majority's reasoning.95 Brennan asserted that Adams did not desert the
principles of Witherspoon; he pointed to particular passages in Adams
showing acceptance of Witherspoon." Moreover, Justice Brennan stated
that the right to an impartial jury does not diminish with the jury's level
of permitted discretion.Y Justice Brennan felt that the placement of a
capital defendant on the same level as a non-capital defendant deprives
the capital defendant of the constitutional protections set out in Witherspoon.98 Brennan concluded that "[t]he Court today establishes an
entirely new standard significantly more lenient than that of Witherspoon.' '
According to Witt, however, the Adams standard differs from the
Witherspoon standard in three ways: (1) the two prongs of the Witherspoon test have been merged into one standard; (2) there is no requirement that only those veniremen who would never vote for the death
penalty be excluded; and (3) the "unmistakable clarity" standard of proof
is now eliminated: °°0 Irrespective of Witt's logic or consistence with
precedent, it is clear that the Supreme Court significantly reduced the
standard of proof required in excluding capital sentencing jurors.
E. Lockhart v. McCree
In 1986, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of how a "death
0
qualified" jury affected the guilt phase of a trial.' ' The Court held in
Lockhart v. McCree that the "death qualification" of the jury violated
neither the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section requirement nor the Sixth
02
Amendment's requirement for an impartial jury.
Adria McCree was convicted of capital felony murder and sentenced
0 3 At trial, the judge
to life imprisonment without possibility of parole.
removed for cause eight veniremen who stated that they could not, under

95. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 439-63 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent was
joined by Justice Marshall.
96. Id. at 450-51. Brennan cited to Adams, 448 U.S. at 44 ("[r]eaffirming that Witherspoon
must be seen as a limitation on the State's power to exclude").
97. Witt, 469 U.S. at 454.
98. Id. at 457.
99. Id.at 452.
100. Id. at 422-23.
101. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 166. On the morning of February 14, 1978, a combination gift shop and service
station was robbed. The owner was shot and killed. That afternoon, police arrested Adria McCree
after they saw him driving a car that matched an eyewitness' description of the getaway car. The
next evening, McCree admitted to the police that he had been at the shop at the time of the
murder. However, he claimed that a tall black stranger first asked him for a ride and then took
McCree's rifle out of the car and used it to kill the owner. McCree further claimed that after the
murder, the stranger rode with him to a nearby dirt road, got out of the car, and walked away
with the rifle. McCree's story was contradicted by two eyewitnesses who saw McCree's car between
the time of the murder and the time when McCree said the stranger got out. They stated that they
only saw one person in the car. The police found McCree's rifle and a bank bag from the shop
alongside the dirt road. Based on ballistics tests, a Federal Bureau of Investigation officer testified
that the bullet that killed the owner had been fired from McCree's rifle. Id. at 165-66.
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any circumstances, vote for the death penalty. 104 McCree claimed on
appeal that the "death qualification" of prospective jurors violated his
rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to have his guilt or
innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a representative
cross-section of the community. 105
In support of his claim, McCree relied on six studies that
concluded
that removing "Witherspoon-excludables" from the jury adversely affects
the guilt determination by the jury. 0 6 The Court reviewed the studies
regarding jurors and their views on capital punishment' 07 and decided
that the studies were "too tentative and fragmentary" to rely upon to
make a claim of constitutional error. 0o Despite the Court's doubt about
these studies, it nonetheless believed that the studies justify an assumption
that death qualified juries are more likely to convict than non-death
qualified juries. 0 9
The Court disagreed with McCree's first argument that the "death
qualification" of juries violated his fair-cross-section requirement of the
Sixth Amendment. 1 0 The Court reasoned:
The essence of a "fair-cross-section" claim is the systematic exclusion
of "a distinctive group in the community." In our view, groups
defined solely in terms of shared attitudes that would prevent or
substantially impair members of the group from performing one of
their duties as jurors, such as the "Witherspoon-excludables" at issue
here, are not "distinctive groups" for fair-cross-section purposes."'
The Court further stated:
"Death qualification," unlike the wholesale exclusion of blacks, women,
or Mexican-Americans from jury service, is carefully designed to serve
the State's concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury
that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the
case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial." 12

104. Id. at 166.
105. Id. at 167.
106. Id. at 168-69. McCree cited the following studies: H. Zeisel, Some Data on Juror Attitudes
Toward Capital Punishment (1968) (University of Chicago monograph); W.C. Wilson, Belief in
Capital Punishment and Jury Performance (1964) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Univ. of
Texas); F.J. Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use
of Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HAav. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 53 (1970);
George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination
Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1971); Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualification
of Jurors' Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV.
53 (1984); Louis Harris & Assocs., Study No. 2016 (1971).
107. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171-72.
108. Id. at 171.
109. Id. at 173.
110. Id. at 174. The Fourteenth Amendment requirement that a neutral jury represent a faircross-section of the community derives from cases addressing the equal protection prohibition in
the selection of jurors. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Adkins v. Texas, 325
U.S. 396 (1945); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
Ill. 476 U.S. at 174 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).
112. Id. at 175-76.
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In holding that "Witherspoon-excludables" may be excluded from jury
service without violating the fair-cross-section requirement, the Court
seemed to be saying that the State's interest in a jury that is willing to
carry out the law outweighs the defendant's interest in selecting a jury
from a group that is representative of the community.
McCree argued that the jury in his trial lacked impartiality because
the absence of "Witherspoon-excludables" "slanted" the jury in favor
of conviction." 3 The Court, however, did not agree with McCree's argument." 4 It found McCree's view of impartiality "illogical and hopelessly
impractical.""' 5 Again, the Court hinges its argument on the State's
a jury that is willing to obey the law and
legitimate interest in selecting
6
consider all punishments."
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented in
Lockhart because he felt that McCree presented "overwhelming evidence"
that "death qualified" juries are substantially more likely to convict than
juries which are not "death qualified.""' Justice Marshall referred to
the Court's opinion in Witherspoon that did not reverse the petitioner's
conviction but nonetheless recognized that "a defendant convicted by [a
properly 'death qualified'] jury in some future case might still attempt
to establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt."""
Marshall felt that Witherspoon left open the possibility of showing a
jury to be impartial as long as the evidence of "conviction proneness"
using Separate juries
was sufficient." 9 He even went so far as to advocate
20
trial.
a
of
phases
penalty
and
for the guilt
Ross v. Oklahoma
In 1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the implications of a trial court's failure to remove for cause a prospective juror
2'
who stated that he would automatically impose the death penalty.'
During the selection of the jury in Ross v. Oklahoma, the Petitioner,
Bobby Lynn Ross, used one of his peremptory challenges to remove a
court should have removed for cause under
venireman whom the trial 22
the Witherspoon standard.

F.

13. Id.at 177.
114. 476 U.S. at 177.
115. Id. at 178.
116. Id. at 180.
117. Id. at 184 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). The dissenters felt that the chief strength in McCree's
evidence was the unanimity of the results obtained by the researchers. Id. at 189 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The Court stated that there are no studies which contradict the studies introduced by
McCree. Id. at 190 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
118. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.
119. McCree, 476 U.S. at 189 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
120. Id.at 204 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
122. Id. at 83.
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Ross was convicted of the murder of a police officer, a capital offense
in Oklahoma. 23 In compliance with Oklahoma statute, Ross was provided
nine peremptory challenges at trial. 24 The Court drew Darrell Huling's
name to replace a venireman excused by a peremptory challenge. 25 During
voir dire, Huling indicated that he might vote to recommend a life
sentence for the defendant. 26 After defense counsel probed Huling further,
it became clear that Huling would vote to impose the death penalty. 27
Defense counsel asked that Huling be removed for cause, but the trial
court denied the motion. 2s In reaction to the trial court's denial, defense
counsel offered his sixth peremptory challenge and removed Huling from
the jury panel. 129 The defense used all nine peremptory challenges. 30 None
of the jurors who sat on the jury was challenged for cause by the defense
counsel.' Ross was ultimately sentenced to death. 3 2
On appeal, the Court found that the trial court erred in failing to
remove Huling for cause because his views would have "prevent[ed] or
substantially impair[ed]" the performance of his duties as a juror. 31 3 The
Court, however, rejected Ross' claims that this error abridged both his
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 14
In denying Ross' impartial jury claim, the Court admitted that if
Huling had actually sat on the jury, the sentence would have been
overturned."' Since Huling was removed by a peremptory challenge,
however, the Court reasoned that any claim of impartiality must focus
not on Huling, but on the jurors who actually sat on the jury. 3 6 The
Court concluded that Ross had failed to establish that the jury was not
impartial. 117
The Court was careful to distinguish the Ross case from Gray v.
Mississippi. 3 In Gray, the State used several of its peremptory challenges
123. Id. The murder was committed in the course of robbing a motel.
124. Id.
125. Id.

126. Id.
127. Id. at 83-84.
128. Id.at 84.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. At the close of the jury selection, the defense did, however, object to the fact that there
were no black people called as jurymen. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 85.

134. Id.This decision was a slight five-to-four majority. Justice Marshall wrote the dissenting
opinion in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. The dissenters reasoned, relying
upon Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987), that the trial judge could not arbitrarily take away
one of the defendant's peremptory challenges, and, therefore, the defense was deprived of an
opportunity to remove an otherwise qualified juror whom it perceived to be sympathetic to the
prosecution. 487 U.S. at 91-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. 487 U.S. at 85. The Court stated that it is well settled that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee a capital defendant the right to an impartial jury. See generally Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
136. 487 U.S. at 86.
137. Id.
138. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
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to remove veniremen who opposed the death penalty and whom the trial
39
court should have excused for cause under Witherspoon. After the
State exhausted all its peremptory challenges, one venireman said that,
although she opposed the death penalty, she could in fact vote to impose
the death penalty in circumstances she found to be appropriate. The trial
court dismissed the venireman for cause since its own errors had left the
State with no more peremptory challenges.,4o The Gray Court overturned
the sentence of death stating that "the relevant inquiry is 'whether the
composition of the jury panel as a4 1 whole could possibly have been
affected by the trial court's error.""11

Ross asserted that if he had not used his sixth peremptory challenge
to remove that venireman, he could have used it on another venireman,
42
thereby significantly changing the composition of the jury. The Court
agreed with this assertion, but refused to extend the "broad language"
of Gray v. Mississippi and apply it "literally."'

14

The Court reasoned

that "there is no need to speculate whether Huling would have been
removed absent the erroneous ruling by the trial court; Huling was in
fact removed and did not sit."'" While the petitioner was required to
exercise a peremptory challenge to cure the trial court's error, the Court
rejected the notion that the loss of a45 peremptory challenge constituted
a violation of the defendant's rights.
Ross claimed that the trial court's failure to remove Huling was also
a due process violation.' 46 Although the Court admitted that the right
to exercise peremptory challenges is "one of the most important of the
rights secured to the accused,' '1 47 the Court rejected the challenge reasoning
that
peremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required
by the Constitution. It is a long settled principle of Oklahoma law
that a defendant who disagrees with the trial court's ruling on a forcause challenge must, in order to preserve the claim that the ruling
deprived him of a fair trial, exercise a peremptory challenge to remove
the juror.' "
The Court clarified this statement to mean that the Oklahoma grant of
nine peremptory challenges was qualified by the requirement that the
defendant must use them to cure erroneous refusals by the trial court

139. Id. at 655.
140. Id. at 669.
141. Id. at 665.
142. Ross, 487 U.S. at 87.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 88.
145. Id.
146. Id.at 88-89.
147. Id. at 89 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
148. Id. The Court stated that "it is for the State to determine the number of peremptory
challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise." Id. The Court
further stated that "[als such, the 'right' to the peremptory challenges is 'denied or impaired' only
if the defendant does not receive that which state law provides." Id.
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to excuse veniremen for cause. 49 As long as the petitioner "received all
that Oklahoma law allowed him," then he "received all that was due."' 150
While the Court refused to overturn the lower court's sentence, it did
announce that the trial court's failure to remove for cause a venireman
who states that he will automatically vote for the death penalty upon
conviction of the defendant is a violation of that defendant's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury." ' The Court emphasized that "[hiad [the juror] sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced
petitioner to death, and had petitioner properly preserved his right to
challenge the trial court's failure to remove [the juror] for cause, the
sentence would have been overturned."'15 2 This affirmation by the Court
signifies its approval of "life qualifying" inquiries of prospective jurors.
III.

MORGAN v. ILLINOIS
In 1992, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the disagreement among
state courts of last resort on the issue of whether voir dire must include
the "life qualifying" or "reverse- Witherspoon" question upon request.' 53
The Court held in Illinois v. Morgan that a state trial court, during voir
dire in a capital case, may not refuse to permit inquiry into whether a
potential juror would automatically impose the death penalty upon a
conviction of the defendant. 5 4
A.

The Facts of the Case
Petitioner Derrick Morgan was convicted of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death in Cook County, Illinois. 55 The evidence at trial
proved that petitioner was hired to kill a narcotics dealer apparently
competing with one of Chicago's violent inner-city gangs.' 5 6 For a payment
of four thousand dollars, the petitioner lured the dealer into an abandoned
apartment and shot him in the head six times.' 57 The jury considered
the aggravating and mitigating factors of the petitioner's case and sentenced him to death.'58

149. Id. at 90.
150. Id. at 91.
151. Id. at 85.
152. Id.
153. Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2226.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The trial of a capital offense in Illinois is conducted in two phases. The same jury
decides both the guilt of the defendant and whether he will be sentenced to death. Upon conviction,
a sentencing hearing convenes to determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. To
be eligible for the death penalty, a unanimous jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the murder and that at least one of
ten statutorily enumerated aggravating circumstances exists. If the jury finds none of the statutory
aggravating circumstances to exist, then the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
There are also five enumerated mitigating circumstances that must be considered by the jury.
Mitigating factors include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the defendant has no significant
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At trial, three separate venires were empaneled before a jury was finally
chosen.'5 9 The State, having elected to pursue capital punishment, requested a "death qualification" inquiry to determine whether any potential
juror would in all instances refuse to impose the death penalty upon
conviction. 160 Accordingly, the trial court questioned the veniremen and
removed seventeen potential jurors who expressed substantial doubts about
to follow Illinois law in deciding whether to impose a death
their ability
161
sentence.
Petitioner's counsel requested that the trial court ask all prospective
jurors the following question: "If you found Derrick Morgan guilty,
would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty no matter
what the facts are?"' 162 The trial court refused counsel's request because
it had already63 "asked the question in a different vein substantially in
that nature."1
The Proceedings Below
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction
and death sentence, and rejected petitioner's claim that, pursuant to Ross
v. Oklahoma, voir dire must include the "life qualifying" or "reverseWitherspoon" question upon request.' M The court concluded that nothing
requires a trial court to question veniremen for the purpose of identifying
which ones would vote for the death penalty in a conviction for a capital
offense. 65 The Illinois Supreme Court also found that, because the jury
was found to be both impartial and selected from a fair cross-section
66
of the community, the trial court had upheld the standard of Ross.

B.

C. The Supreme Court Decision: The Majority Opinion
Justice White divided his majority opinion into four sub-parts. The
majority first addressed the issue of whether the constitutional right to
history of criminal activity; (2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (3) the victim was a participant in the
defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act; (4) the defendant acted under
compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm; and (5)
the defendant was not personally present during the commission of the act or the acts causing
death. If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude
the sentence of death, then the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Id. at 2225-26 (citing
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1990)).
159. Id. at 2226.
160. Id. In accordance with Illinois law, the trial court, rather than the attorneys, conducted voir
dire.
161. Id. The jurors that were eventually empaneled responded negatively to the following question:
"Would you automatically vote against the death penalty no matter what the facts of the case
were?"
162. Id.
163. Id. The trial court asked nine jurors the following question: "Would you follow my instructions
on the law, even though you may not agree?" All nine jurors answered this question affirmatively.
The question was not put to the three remaining jurors. Id. The court also asked every juror
whether he or she could be fair and impartial. Id.
1991).
164. People v. Morgan, 568 N.E.2d 755 (Ill.
165. Id. at 778.
166. Id.
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an impartial jury imposes a requirement that the jury be impartial toward
sentencing.'67 The Court noted that Duncan v. Louisiana 68 held that the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed a right to a jury trial in all state
criminal cases that might subject the defendant to imprisonment. 69 Furthermore, principles underlying due process suggest that if a jury is to
be provided to the defendant it must stand impartial and indifferent to
the extent commanded by the Sixth Amendment. 70 A sentencing jury in
7
a capital case, thus, must be impartial. '
Second, the Court explored whether a defendant in a capital case is
entitled to challenge for cause and remove on the ground of bias a
prospective juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty irrespective of the facts or law of the case. 72 Under the standard set forth
in Witt, a venireman who could not vote for the imposition of the death
penalty in any case is not an impartial venireman and must be removed
for cause. 17 The Court, as a result, reiterated its view set forth in Ross
that a venireman who will automatically vote to impose the death penalty
is not an impartial venireman: '74 "[A] juror who will automatically vote
for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider
the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do so.'" 7 A capital defendant, thus, may challenge
for cause such a venireman on the basis that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes the requirement of impartiality. 76
The Court's third sub-issue dealt with the voir dire process and whether
a court, upon a defendant's request, must inquire into prospective jurors'
views on capital punishment.' 77 Although the State of Illinois did not
challenge the voir dire process, it argued that the trial court may refuse
direct inquiry into a juror's views on capital punishment as long as the
court assures the defendant a fair and impartial jury. 78 The Supreme
Court did not agree with the State's argument and held that the principles
outlined in Witherspoon demand inquiry into prospective jurors' views
on capital punishment. If this inquiry identifies a juror who will auto-

167. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2228.
168. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
169. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2228.

170. Id. at 2229 (citing Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466 (1965)).
171. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229-30.
172. Id. at 2228.

173. Id. at 2229.
174. Id.
175. Id. This point was explored in more detail by the Court in the last part of its opinion.
The Court stated that such a juror deems mitigating evidence to be irrelevant to his decision to
impose the death penalty. By doing so, the juror is unable to follow the law of Illinois which
states that certain mitigating factors must be considered in deciding whether to impose the death
penalty. Therefore, the juror is announcing his intention not to follow the law. Id. at 2233-34.
176. Id. at 2229-30.
177. Id. at 2228.
178. Id. at 2230.
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matically vote for the death penalty, then that juror will not be considered
impartial. 17 9

The fourth sub-issue that the Court decided was whether the voir dire

in Morgan was constitutionally sufficient. 80 The Court rejected the State's
argument that the "general fairness" and "follow the law" questions

were sufficient.' 8 ' "[Sluch jurors-whether they be unalterably in favor

of or opposed to the death penalty in every case-by definition are the
82

ones who cannot perform their duties in accordance with the law.'

The Court reasoned that the belief that death should be imposed ipso
facto upon the conviction of a capital offense reflects directly on an
individual's ability to follow the law. 18 The Court concluded that the
petitioner in Morgan was entitled, upon his request, to inquire into the
views of those veniremen who would have automatically imposed the
death penalty. 18
After much discussion the Court ultimately held that the "inadequacy
of voir dire" lead the majority to doubt that the petitioner was sentenced
to death by a jury empaneled in compliance with the Fourteenth Amend-

reversed
ment. 18 The petitioner's sentence did not stand and the Court
186
and remanded the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court.

D. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia, in a strong dissent, revealed two logical flaws in the
majority opinion. 187 First, he attacked the assertion that a juror who will
automatically impose the death penalty "will fail in good faith to consider

179. Id. at 2230-32. The Court stated:
[Wlere voir dire not available to lay bare the foundation of petitioner's challenge
for cause against those prospective jurors who would always impose death following
conviction, his right not to be tried by such jurors would be rendered as nugatory
and meaningless as the State's right, in the absence of questioning, to strike those
who would never do so.
Id. at 2232.
180. Id. at 2228.
181. Id. at 2232. The Court noted that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the
law and yet be unaware that his views on the death penalty would prevent him from doing so.
Id. at 2233. The Court remarked, "Witherspoon and its succeeding cases would be in large measure
superfluous were this Court convinced that such general inquiries could detect those jurors with
views preventing or substantially impairing their duties in accordance with their instructions and
oath." Id. at 2232-33.
The State's argument that the "reverse-Witherspoon" inquiry is not pertinent because of a
"quantitative difference" was also rejected. Because Illinois requires a unanimous verdict in favor
of imposing death, any juror can nullify the imposition of the death penalty. However, a personwho votes automatically for the death penalty would not carry the same weight because he would
still need to persuade the remaining eleven jurors to also vote for the death penalty. The Court
cited Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988), in stating that "even one such juror on the panel
would be one too many." Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2233 n.8.
182. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2233.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2235.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2235 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent was joined in by Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas.
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the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do." 88 Justice Scalia would have agreed with this
assertion "if it were true that the instructions required jurors to deem
certain evidence to be 'mitigating' and to weigh that evidence in deciding
the penalty.'

8 9

However, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for failing to describe
the key instructions given to the jury.' 90 He stated that the jury was
instructed to consider all aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
impose the death penalty if no mitigating factors sufficiently precluded
it.' 9' According to Scalia, the instructions did not further define what
constitutes a mitigating factor. 92 He stated that this flexible scheme
allowed each juror to define for himself whether a particular item of
evidence was mitigating. 93 Scalia felt that Illinois law did not, therefore,
preclude "a juror from taking the bright-line position that there are no
valid reasons why a defendant who has committed a contract killing
should not be sentenced to death."''
Scalia felt that the juror in that
situation does not fail to consider the evidence, but, rather, he simply
fails to give it the effect the defendant desires. 95
Justice Scalia also attacked the majority's reliance on Ross v. Oklahoma.' 96 The Court in Ross expressed the view that, had the venireman
actually served, "the sentence would have to be overturned."' 9 7 In response, Scalia stated that this statement was based entirely on the fact
that the State court had assumed that such a juror was unwilling to
follow the law during the penalty phase of the trial. 9 8 He further pointed

188. Id. at 2229 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2237 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
191. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
192. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
193. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
194. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
195. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court noted that the Illinois statute lists certain potentially
mitigating factors, and, therefore, concludes that the legislature deemed them relevant to the imposition
of the penalty. Id. at 2234. Justice Scalia, however, feels that these listed factors are only relevant
in the sense that a juror may find them to be mitigating, and also in the sense that the defendant
must be allowed to introduce evidence concerning these factors. Scalia stated that "[the fact that
the jury has the discretion to deem evidence to be mitigating cannot establish that there is an
obligation to do so." Id. at 2237 n.3 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
The Illinois statute actually states:
If .. .the jury finds that none of the [aggravating] factors set forth in subsection
(b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment ....
If there is a unanimous finding that one or more of the factors set forth in
subsection (b) exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as
instructed by the court and shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be
imposed. If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence
the defendant to death .. . . [Otherwise] the court shall sentence the defendant to
a term of imprisonment.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(g) (1990).
196. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
197. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988).
198. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2239 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) (citing Ross, 487 U.S. at 84-85).
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out that the Court did not examine this point independently. 99 Justice
Scalia concluded that "[blecause Illinois law would not violate due process
by seating a juror who will not be swayed by mitigating evidence at the
does not entitle petitioner to identify
weighing stage, the Constitution
' 2
such jurors during voir dire. 00
Next, Justice Scalia attacked the majority's assertion that the Constitution requires the trial court to specifically inquire about the death
penalty. 20' Scalia reminded the Court that except where interracial capital
crimes are at issue, trial courts "retain[] great latitude in deciding what
questions should be asked on voir dire. ' 20 2 Furthermore, a defendant is
entitled to ask specific questions only if the failure to ask them would
render the trial fundamentally unfair. 20 3 Justice Scalia saw no reason why
veniremen who always impose capital punishment for murder cannot be
identified using more general questions concerning the fairness and willingness to follow the law. 204
Justice Scalia went on to distinguish the instant case from Witherspoon,
Adams, and Witt. He stated that Witherspoon did not give the State a
right to exclude veniremen, but rather the State was constitutionally
permitted to exclude veniremen who would not impose death under any
facts. 205 In the instant case, however, the Court held that a State is
constitutionally compelled to exclude veniremen who would automatically
impose death. 206 Scalia did not consider this inconsistency a "very short
20 7
step," but rather a "great leap over an unbridgeable chasm of logic.
He added that "[tihe Court's argument that because the Constitution
208
requires one it must require the other obviously rests on a false premise."
E. Analysis
The Morgan case makes sense because it balances the group of persons
allowed to sit on the jury in a capital punishment case. If prospective

199. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
Even if I agreed with the Court, however, that jurors who will always advocate
a death sentence for capital murder are not "impartial" and must be excused for
cause, I would not agree with the further conclusion that the Constitution requires
a trial court to make specific inquiries on this subject during voir dire.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Mu'Min v. Virginia, III S. Ct. 1899, 1904 (1991)).
203. Id. at 1903.
204. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2240 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2240-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2240 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia claimed:
If, as the Court claims, this case truly involved "the reverse" of the principles
established in Witherspoon and the cases following it, . . . then it is difficult to
understand why petitioner would not be. entitled to challenge, not just those jurors
who will "automatically" impose the death penalty, but also those whose sentiments
on the subject are sufficiently strong that their faithful service as jurors will be
"substantially impaired." . . . The Court's failure to carry its premise to its logical
conclusion suggests its awareness that the premise is wrong.
Id. at 2241 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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jurors are strongly opposed to the death penalty and are not allowed to
sit on the jury, then, in the interest of fairness, it would seem logical
that those prospective jurors strongly in favor of the death penalty should
not be allowed to sit on the jury either.
Morgan v. Illinois, however, failed to strike a perfect balance between
"life qualification" and "death qualification." The Morgan Court held
thit a state trial court may not refuse to inquire into whether a potential
juror would automatically impose the death penalty. 2°9 Wainwright v.
Witt, on the other hand, changed the standard for excluding veniremen
opposed to capital punishment when it held that all of those whose views
would "prevent or substantially impair" the performance of his duties
as a juror should not be allowed to sit.21° The term "automatically"
used in Morgan is actually a throwback to Witherspoon v. Illinois.211
Yet, it is unclear why the Court ignored twenty-four years of developed
laws regarding "death qualification" and then started that same process
again for "life qualification. 2 12 Justice Scalia's answer to this confusion
is that "[tihe Court's failure to carry its premise to its logical conclusion
21
suggests its awareness that the premise is wrong.
In requiring trial courts to inquire whether prospective jurors would
automatically impose the death penalty, the Morgan Court reasoned that
such a juror would not be able to "consider the evidence of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do.' '214
The Court stated that because such a juror has already formed an opinion
on the sentence, the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating
circumstances is irrelevant. 21 This argument makes sense in light of
Lockett v. Ohio which held that jurors may not be precluded from
21 6
considering any evidence offered by the defendant as mitigating.
Justice Scalia, however, felt that a juror who would automatically
impose the death sentence would not be precluded from considering
mitigating factors and giving these factors the effect the defendant desired. 21 7 There appears to be some truth to Justice Scalia's argument, yet
it circumvents the issue. A juror who has already decided the defendant's

209.
210.
Court
211.
212.

112 S.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 2222.
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). In holding that the new test was proper, the
specifically rejected the test set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois. Id. at 420-23.
391 U.S. 510, 515 n.9 (1968).
In fact, the Supreme Court in Morgan discussed the two different standards:
Witt held that "the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may
be excused for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is
whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance
of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' ...
Under this standard, it is clear from Witt and Adams, the progeny of Witherspoon
that a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his
or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause.
Ct. at 2229.
Id. at 2241 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2229.
Id.
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2238 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sentence before the sentencing hearing at trial will not give the evidence
the full consideration that is required by law.
Justice Scalia also noted another inconsistency in the majority's reasoning. The majority stated that, since Witherspoon v. Illinois requires
removal of all veniremen who are unalterably opposed to the death
penalty, it is also logical to require the removal of all veniremen who

would automatically impose

it.211

This statement, however, is not entirely

true. Witherspoon created a limitation upon a State's right to remove a
venireman;
it did not grant a right to the defendant to require such a
219
removal.

In reality, Scalia's theory is not entirely logical. It is not important
that the State need not remove a venireman who refuses to vote for the
death penalty. If the State's decision is to remove veniremen who refuse
to vote for the death penalty, then the State should be required to afford
the defendant a chance to remove those veniremen who will automatically
vote for the death penalty. Only then will the panel of jurors be balanced
and impartial.
IV.

THE STATUS OF "DEATH QUALIFICATION" AND "LIFE
QUALIFICATION" OF JURORS AFTER MORGAN

A.

How Recent Cases Have Interpreted Morgan
Only a handful of cases have interpreted Morgan v. Illinois since it
was decided in 1992. There is no clear indication how courts will interpret
Morgan because only a few have followed its holding m while other courts
have distinguished it.221
B.

A Model Death Qualification Statute
A statute detailing when a venireman may be removed for cause on
the basis of her views on the death penalty may be desirable in a
jurisdiction that recognizes the death penalty and gives the jury ample
discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed
in a particular case.
Upon the request of either the prosecution or the defense, in a case
in which there is a potential of capital punishment being imposed,
a trial court is required to inquire into a venireman's views on the
death penalty. If the potential juror states with unmistakable clarity

218. Id. at 2232.
219. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Escobar, 803 F. Supp. 611 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); People v. Smith,
604 N.E.2d 858 (Ill. 1992).
221. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992); United States, ex rel.
Landgham, v. Weborn, No. 92 C 1013 (N.D. 111.Nov. 30, 1992); People v. DeSantis, 831 P.2d
1210 (Cal. 1992); People v. McClellan, 600 N.E.2d 407 (Ill. 1992); State v. Hill, 417 S.E.2d 765
(N.C. 1992); Mueller v. Commonwealth, 422 S.E.2d 380 (Va. 1992); Satcher v. Commonwealth,
421 S.E.2d 821 (Va. 1992).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

that his views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially
impair his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and
oath, either in his determination of guilt or in choosing the sentence,
then the trial court must remove him for cause.
This statute gives the prosecution and defense the same rights to inquire
into a venireman's views. This right afforded to both attorneys promotes
fairness and impartiality in the voir dire procedure. Furthermore, the
statute, in accordance with the holding in Morgan v. Illinois,222 allows
potential jurors whose views are either strongly in favor of or strongly
opposed to the death penalty to be removed from the panel.
The statute also requires that the trial court remove any potential juror
whose views would prevent or substantially impair him from obeying the
law and performing his duties as a juror. The "prevent or substantially
impair" standard set forth in Wainwright v. Witt 223 is still the current
standard in "death qualification" of juries. Even though the "life qualification" standard set out in Morgan permits disqualification of veniremen who would "automatically" vote to impose the death penalty
upon conviction of a capital crime 2 24 it seems more logical and impartial
to use the same standard in both "death qualification" and "life qualification" cases.
Furthermore, the statute complies with Witherspoon's "unmistakable
clarity" requirement, 225 because it insures that challenges of scrupled jurors
are based on what the jurors say, not on what the judge infers that the
jurors feel on the issue of capital punishment.
Finally, the statute specifically includes a requirement that a venireman
be removed if his views are so strong as to bias his decision during the
guilt phase of a trial. According to Witherspoon,226 a juror cannot be
impartial if his views will bias his decision as to either the guilt of the
defendant or the appropriate punishment.
C. How to Challenge a State's Death Qualification Statute or a
Particular Case in Which the Death Sentence Has Been Imposed
There are several standards a state must-follow to ensure that its jury
selection statute is constitutional.
First, the defense must be given the opportunity to question a venireman
as to his views on the death penalty. 227 Without this requirement, the
holding in Morgan would be meaningless. If either the statute or the

222. 112 S. Ct. at 2235.
223. 469 U.S. at 424. While Witt quoted this language from Adams v. Texas, and stated that
it was a departure from the standard set forth in Witherspoon, this may not have been necessarily
true. As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent, Adams showed acceptance of the Witherspoon
standard. 469 U.S. at 450-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the lower courts did not apply
Adams as creating a new standard. See Rosenson, supra note 89, at 325.
224. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2229.
225. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516 n.9.
226. Id. at 522 n.21.
227. Morgan, 112 S. Ct. at 2232 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 170 n.7 (1986)).
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trial court does not provide the defendant this opportunity, then a death
sentence must be overturned.
Second, the State may not excuse for cause a potential juror unless
his views against capital punishment are so strong as to "prevent or
substantially impair" his ability to follow the law and upheld his oath
as a juror. 28 Witherspoon and its progeny, Witt, act as limitations upon
the State.229 If either the state statute or the trial court allows the
prosecution to unconstitutionally remove veniremen for cause, then a
death sentence must be reversed.
Third, the defendant must be given the opportunity to remove for
cause all potential jurors whose views in favor of capital punishment are
so strong that they would automatically impose the death penalty upon
conviction of a capital crime. 2 0 This "life qualification" standard of the
venire is established to produce an impartial jury. If the state statute
prohibits the removal of jurors who would impose the death penalty or
the trial court fails to remove these jurors, then the sentence of death
must be overturned.
Finally, it is important to note that these three standards only apply
to the sentencing phase and not the guilt phase of trial. 231 If the defendant
is not actually sentenced to death then this issue may not be brought
up on appeal.
V.

CONCLUSION

The selection of juries in capital cases is often an extremely complicated,
yet important, part of the trial. While the "death qualification" and
"life qualification" of the venire is only a small aspect of that process,
it is nonetheless crucial. Without the chance to make the jury both fair
and impartial with respect to its members' views on capital punishment,
the State would be allowed to "hand-pick"
jurors who would execute
23 2
the particular defendant on trial.
Today, a venireman may be excused for cause only if his views in
opposition to the death penalty are so strong that he will be either
"prevented or substantially impaired" from following the law and upholding his oath as a juror. 23 This standard is permissive and does
nothing more than place a limitation on the State's power to exclude
potential jurors for cause. On the other hand, a venireman must be
excused for cause if his views in favor of the death penalty are so strong
23 4
that he will "automatically" vote for the imposition of the death penalty.
The defendant then has a right to inquire into a potential juror's views
and remove him for cause.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Witt, 469 U.S. at 424.
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 43-45 (1980).
Morgan, 112 S. Ct. 2222.
See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518.
Schnapper, supra note 1, at 985.
Witt, 469 U.S. at 424.
Morgan, 112 S. Ct. 2222.
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The respective standards for "death qualification" and "life qualification" of potential jurors appear to be perfectly balanced. But this
appearance is illusory. The fact that one standard is permissive and the
other mandatory may seem relatively unimportant because it merely reflects the nature of the party who would assert the right. More importantly,
the language used in the two standards- "prevent or substantially impair"
and "automatically" -is not impartial language. Juries will achieve real
neutrality when the standards for assessing attitudes toward the death
penalty are consistent. Only then will our criminal justice system be in
compliance with the Constitution's mandate that "the accused shall enjoy
'
the right to .. . an impartial jury." 235

235. U.S. CONST. amend. V1.

